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BILL MANNING 
Since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
there has been a growing interest in the history of 
the Cold War. The work of authors Sean Maloney 
and Paul Ozorak, among others, has drawn atten-
tion to the Canadian government's role in national 
and civil defence measures during this period.1 
The "Diefenbunker" at Carp, west of Ottawa, now 
being restored and operated as a museum, serves 
as a fascinating reminder of the Canadian Gov-
ernment's efforts to defend against nuclear attack. 
This complex, massive by Canadian standards, 
was never large enough to accommodate all the 
personnel and operations that would have been 
necessary during a national emergancy. Maloney 
and Ozarak allude to a network of other, smaller, 
facilities distributed throughout the Ottawa area. 
The "Diefenbunker Tours 1997" pamphlet refers 
to "some smaller bunkers" and to "a variety of 
relocation sites dotted throughout the country." 
The purpose of this article is to explore the role of 
these smaller installations within the civil defence 
network in the Ottawa area and illuminate an 
important but neglected aspect of Canada's Cold 
War preparations. 
Historical Context 
The Cold War developed from mutual distrust and 
hostility between the Soviet Union and its former 
Western Allies as they faced each other across a 
divided Europe following the Second World War. 
When the Soviets seized power in Czechoslovakia 
in 1948 and blockaded Berlin in 1948-49, the Allies 
responded in April 1949 by forming the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to present a 
united front against communist aggression. After 
the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 
August 1949 the possibility of a devastating nuclear 
attack became an omnipresent concern of both 
sides in the Cold War. 
In Canada, preparations against Soviet attack 
began as early as October 1948 with the appoint-
ment by the federal government of recently retired 
Major-General F. F. Worthington to the position of 
Civil Defence Coordinator. The office initially 
operated within the Department of National 
Defence, but in February 1951 was transferred to 
the Department of Health and Welfare.2 Concern 
over possible Soviet attack increased after the 
successful explosion of their first atomic bomb 
as tension increased during the Korean War of 
1950-53. The Soviets successfully detonated a 
hydrogen bomb in 1954, one year after the 
Americans. Not only was this device vastly more 
powerful than the previous atomic weapons, but 
the adoption of inter-continental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) to replace manned bombers as the main 
delivery system meant that an attack could be 
completed with considerably less warning than 
was previously the case. 
In 1956 the Liberal government of Louis St 
Laurent appointed an intergovernmental depart-
mental working group to investigate Canada's civil 
and military preparedness. Its report, presented in 
January 1957, recommended the construction of an 
emergency headquarters for the federal government 
near Ottawa, and smaller regional headquarters 
in each province. It also recommended that the 
civil defence organization within the Department 
of Health and Welfare be reorganized into a larger 
agency with responsibility for co-ordinating over-
all "Continuity of Government" planning, and 
report directly to the prime minister.3 
Within one month of winning the election of 
June 1957, the new Conservative government, 
under the leadership of John Diefenbaker, accepted 
the recommendations of the 1956 working group 
and established the new co-ordinating agency called 
the Emergency Measures Organization (EMO). Its 
Director, R B. Curry, reported to the Clerk of the Privy 
Council. In 1959 the government expanded the 
EMO's mandate to include the protection of the civil-
ian population as well as continuity of government.4 
The new Conservative government also approved 
the construction of the Diefenbunker, a huge, self-
sufficient, shock-resistant, reinforced, radiation-proof 
underground complex with an elaborate protected 
communications network, built between 1959 and 
1962.5 Its official name, Project EASE (Experimental 
Army Signals Establishment), was intended to 
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disguise its actual role as Canadian Emergency 
Government Headquarters (CEGHQ). Here the 
prime minister, Governor-General, senior govern-
ment, civil defence, judicial, police and military 
officials would be housed in relative safety during 
a nuclear attack.6 
EASE was the nerve centre of the Emergency 
Radio Relay (ERR) system that linked the Diefen-
bunker to its regional counterparts in Debert, Nova 
Scotia; Valcartier, Quebec; Camp Borden, Ontario; 
Penhold, Alberta; and Nanaimo, British Columbia 
(plans for comparable facilities in Prince Edward 
Island, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were never 
implemented). These had been built under Project 
BRIDGE and were known officially as Regional 
Emergency Government Headquarters (REGHQs). 
It also provided communication with NATO and 
North American Air Command (NORAD) head-
quarters as well as with air surveillance (radar) 
tracking stations and air defence units. 
Each REGHQ was the focal point of its own 
regional communications and public emergency 
broadcasting network. The Canadian Army's 
1st Army Signals Squadron, Royal Canadian Corps 
of Signals (RCCS), operated all communications 
systems, using the new STRAD (Signals Trans-
mission Receiving and Distribution) computer 
system in the Diefenbunker. Two unattended 
antenna yards at Dunrobin and Almonte picked 
up incoming signals and relayed them through 
buried land lines to the main receiver inside the 
Diefenbunker. A third underground cable con-
nected the Diefenbunker to a radio transmitter 
station at the "Richardson Detachment," located 
between Perth and Smiths Falls. This facility 
consisted of a two-story bunker and a transmitter 
antenna yard, manned by about twenty army com-
munications personnel. A fourth underground 
cable connected Richardson to the Federal Depart-
ment Relocation Site (discussed below) in the 
basement of the Federal Building at Smiths Falls.7 
Nuclear tension between the two super powers 
reached a peak in 1962 during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, when the United States and the Soviet 
Union came to the brink of war over the presence 
of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba. Once the 
Soviets agreed to withdraw their weapons, tensions 
began to ease as the two superpowers contem-
plated the consequences of their brush with 
mutual annihilation. In 1963 they signed the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and ongoing negotiations 
ushered in a decade of détente. Canadian civil and 
national defence budgets, which had increased 
annually throughout the 1950s to peak in fiscal 
year 1961/62, declined thereafter as steadily as 
they had risen.8 
Continuity of Government 
"Continuity of Government" (COG) was defined 
as those measures taken to keep the essential func-
tions of government operating during a nuclear 
attack, and to restore order after the emergency had 
subsided. Project RUSTIC provided plans for desig-
nated government officials to escape to safe havens, 
such as the Diefenbunker, once a nuclear attack 
against Ottawa was confirmed. Here, they would 
be accommodated during the initial "shock" phase 
of up to fourteen days, and then be in a position 
to manage the re-establishment of civil authority 
Fig.l 
Detail from the Canadian 
Army Signal System Line 
Telegraph Diagram showing 
telegraph (telex) lines con-
necting the Diefenbunker 
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Fig. 2 
Canadian civil defence 
authorities arranged 
relocation sites in a 
semicin le upwind of 
the anticipated fallout 
pattern and within 
one hoar's drive from 
downtown Ottawa. 
(Reprinted with permission 
from "DrStrangelove 
Visits Canada. "Canadian 
Military History 6, no. 1 
(Spring 1997): 48.) 
during the ensuing thirty-day "recovery" phase. 
EMO co-ordinated the overall civilian COG com-
ponent, identified areas of responsibility for 
various departments and encouraged them to 
develop emergency plans, identify and store 
essential records and provide instructions and 
postings to key officials according to departmental 
"manning" plans.9 
Following the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49, the 
Canadian army adopted informal plans to use a 
number of sites in the Ottawa area as emergency 
headquarters in case the capital was attacked. 
Constructed in 1954 as a site for training civil 
defence workers, die Canadian Civil Defence 
College in Arnprior, north of Ottawa, the site of an 
old airfield, became the temporary emergency gov-
ernment headquarters. In 1957, when the decision 
was made to build the Diefenbunker, the Canadian 
Army base at Petawawa was designated interim 
CEGHQ until die Diefenbunker opened in 1962. 
This facility combined the functions of bodi 
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Even as construction of the Diefenbunker began, 
COG planners clearly realized that the new 
complex would be too small to accommodate the 
required number of essential emergency personnel, 
since the search for alternate accommodations 
began almost immediately. A separate but related 
requirement was space to stockpile supplies for 
the relief of civilian evacuees from Ottawa in the 
aftermadi of a nuclear attack. To minimize costs 
they considered basements in existing buildings 
such as schools, churches and community centres. 
Closer examination showed most of these buildings 
to be too crowded or already in use, so EMO decided 
to construct two entirely new buildings for this pur-
pose, called Federal Readiness Units, in Kemptville 
and in Carleton Place. 
Being above ground, these buildings were only 
suitable for use during the recovery phase of an 
attack, leaving open the question of how to accom-
modate additional federal emergency personnel 
during the shock phase. To secure the necessary 
"Relocation Sites," EMO devised a four-part strategy. 
First, it identified temporary unprotected basement 
accommodations in existing federal buildings in 
Renfrew and Pembroke. Second, it arranged for 
future federal buildings in suitable locations to be 
built with special protected basements. For example, 
the basement of the new Federal Building in Smiths 
Falls, then under construction, would become a 
relocation site. Third, it developed specifications 
for a protected basement to be included in a new 
building planned for the Canadian Civil Defence 
College in Arnprior. Fourth, two more relocation 
sites, each capable of accommodating forty people, 
were excavated beneath the Readiness Units already 
under construction at Kemptville and Carleton Place 
in 1961, at a cost of $25 671.10 
Relocation sites served as rallying points for 
departmental officials with assignments under 
RUSTIC'S manning plans and formed centres from 
which diese officials could carry out essential 
government operations and provide support to the 
group at the Diefenbunker. RUSTIC planners chose 
locations west of Ottawa, upwind of die target, to 
avoid radiation from the fell-out pattern, expected 
to be carried east of the city by the region's prevail-
ing westerly winds. Logic dictated that they should 
be far enough away from the target to be immune 
from the immediate effects of the detonation. They 
should also be close enough that assigned personnel 
could reach them by motor vehicle in about an hour 
and have basic operations and communications 
set up within three hours.11 (Fig. 2). 
Designated personnel were expected to report 
to their emergency assignments using ttieir own 
automobiles, if possible, especially if an alert was 
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broadcast outside normal working hours. Advance 
and intermediate parties could board special buses 
marked "RUSTIC" at the Supreme Court Building 
on Wellington Street in Ottawa and be driven to their 
designated emergency assignments. Alternatively, 
they could flag down a bus at any point along the 
route, using a flashlight at night. In the event of a 
"crash action" alert, the highest level of emergency 
warning, special trains would depart Union Station, 
the major railway transportation hub in downtown 
Ottawa (across from the Chateau Laurier Hotel), to 
take personnel to their designated relocation sites 
along Canadian Pacific Railway lines.12 
The Kemptville and Carleton Place Relocation 
Sites were originally intended to accommodate 
forty people for up to fourteen or fifteen days. To 
maximize the use of this space, EMO adopted the 
"hotbed" system, rotating twelve-hour shifts so that 
two people shared one bed, that allowed eighty 
people to be sequestered under austere conditions, 
since only forty would be on duty or sleeping at 
any time.13 
In 1961, EMO recommended to an Interdepart-
mental Committee on Civil Emergency Planning 
that the underground facilities in Kemptville and 
Carleton Place both be enlarged to accommodate 
an additional 100 people, for a total of 180 people 
each.14 At the same time, it arranged for the 
Department of Public Works to proceed with the 
construction of a bunker under the Canadian Civil 
Defence College in Amprior, which was to accom-
modate 100 emergency personnel. By the time of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, however, 
the government had only two protected Relocation 
Sites in the Ottawa area other than the Diefenbunker: 
those at Kemptville and Carleton Place. Cabinet 
ministerial personnel were to be divided among the 
three locations to ensure continuity of leadership 
should one or even two be disabled in an attack. 
Only later, some time during 1963 or 1964, did the 
third relocation site in Smiths Falls become opera-
tional as well.15 
As seen above, expenditures for COG measures 
declined after 1962. Significantly, in 1963 EMO was 
moved from the Privy Council Office to the less 
central Ministry of Defence Production. The Liberal 
government of Prime Minister Lester Pearson, which 
replaced Diefenbaker's Conservatives in 1963, con-
tinued to develop and refine plans for civil defence 
involving EMO, but little of significance was 
accomplished between then and 1967, when the 
government embarked upon serious budget cutting 
to deal with mounting inflation.16 
In 1964, EMO disposed of plans to expand the 
Kemptville and Carleton Place basement units, 
and instead proposed that plans for the bunker at 
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Amprior be revised to provide accommodation for 
200 or more people. At the same time, shrinking 
budgets made it necessary to cancel plans to enlarge 
the Diefenbunker at Carp.17 
For a time, EMO considered an alternate long-term 
plan to construct Relocation Sites in the basements 
of federal buildings in Cornwall and Almonte. 
EMO soon ruled out Cornwall as the location for 
a relocation site because of its proximity to the 
Moses-Saunders Hydro-Electric Generating Plant, 
a likely target for nuclear attack.18 Nor was a reloca-
tion site ever constructed at Almonte. The Royal 
Military College, Old Fort Henry in Kingston, and 
the Federal Building in Brockville were for a time 
considered as alternatives, but were rejected because 
the facilities were too intensively used and too far 
from Ottawa.19 
In 1966, EMO recommended that, pending 
more satisfactory economic conditions, unpro-
tected above ground accommodation at the 
Canadian Civil Defence College in Amprior be 
used as a Relocation Site until its underground 
bunker was completed. At the same time, RUSTIC 
personnel were also authorized to occupy the 
above ground, or "general areas," of the units in 
Kemptville and Carleton Place if radiation levels 
remained at acceptable levels. EMO estimated 
that each site could house up to 243 people, if 
they used the improtected above-ground portion 
as well as the eighty places in the protected bunker 
below ground. In addition, it proposed that staff 
could use off-site storage and living accommo-
dation as long as it was close enough to reach the 
shelter quickly in the event of a fallout warning. 
The Smiths Falls relocation site was reorganized 
to accommodate eighty people (up from its original 
sixty) but, since the above ground portion was 
already occupied by the Post Office and a number 
of other government offices, arranging for use of the 
building's unprotected areas was more difficult. 
Officials hoped that, once the Amprior Relocation 
Site was completed, assignments could be redis-
tributed so that Kemptville and Carleton Place 
would only be required to house a maximum total 
staff of 168. In the interim, EMO had no choice 
but to settle for significantly reduced operational 
capacity should an emergency occur. 
After closer examination, EMO analysts ques-
tioned whether the Kemptville and Carleton Place 
building systems had the capacity to accommodate 
such large numbers of people. Would the wells, 
storage capacity, sewage and air conditioning 
systems be adequate to support eighty people over 
fourteen days when they had originally been 
designed for only forty, let alone a further 200 
or more people above ground?20 Such concerns 
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Fig. 3 (top) 
The KempMlle Building, 
now Canada Jivjning 
Centre #270 
Fig. 4 (above) 
The Carleton Place 
Building, now the 
"Olde Barracks Office 
and Meeting Centre" 
resulted in plans to install a relocation site in 
Pembroke. This would ease demands on the 
existing sites, and further disperse the program. 
The distance of Pembroke from Ottawa and its 
direction upwind were within guidelines. 
Under a new prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, 
EMO's budget was slashed and its staff cut by a 
third in the federal budget of 1968/69. In July 1968, 
responsibility for the organization was moved yet 
again, this time to the relatively junior deputy 
minister of national defence. Serious thinking 
began as to what sites could be maintained and 
it was about this time that the term Public Service 
Training Centre (PSTC), presumably to refer to the 
above ground portion, begins to appear in govern-
ment documents with reference to the Kemptville 
and Carleton Place sites.21 
As of September 1968, official documents refer 
to five protected relocation sites planned for the 
Ottawa region: 
1. Public Service Commission Training 
and Development Centre — Highway 
16, Kemptville. 
2. Public Service Commission Training and 
Development Centre — Highway 29, 
Carleton Place. 
3. Federal Building — Market Street North, 
Smiths Falls. 
4. Federal Building — Mackay and 
Pembroke Streets, Pembroke. 
5. Canadian Civil Defence College — 
Arnprior22 
Only the first three sites would ever be opera-
tional. The proposed relocation site at the Canadian 
Civil Defence College in Arnprior, intended to 
house up to 280 people and planned for completion 
in 1967, was plagued by funding shortages and 
labour disruptions, and was never completed.23 
Also, the proposed relocation site in Pembroke 
never progressed beyond the planning stages. 
Basement space in federal buildings in Smiths 
Falls was reassigned and the access tunnels filled 
in. Only the Kemptville and Carleton Place sites 
managed to survive. Government reports from 
1968 reveal that by then, both buildings, or at least 
their basements, were showing unmistakable 
signs of neglect.24 
T h e Kemptvi l le a n d 
Carleton Place Bui ldings 
The buildings at Kemptville and Carleton Place are 
the only Canadian Cold War installations in the 
Ottawa area, apart from the Diefenbunker, to survive 
to the present time. They are also an interesting 
case study as they incorporated most of the varied 
operations associated with both civil and national 
defence that COG installed to the west of Ottawa, 
beyond the Diefenbunker. Each is a two-storey 
frame structure resembling a military barracks, 
occupying 12 000 square feet above ground and 
6 000 below ground. Even today, they are virtually 
identical in apearance. As to the operations carried 
out there, both primary and secondary sources 
tend to use a number of terms interchangeably 
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roles. The following, it is hoped, will help clear up 
some of the confusion. 
Welfare Service Accommodation Centre (WSAC) 
Ozorak points out that this was the term first used 
to designate the Kemptville and Carleton Place 
buildings. It most likely came into use before 1957, 
when the Department of Health and Welfare was 
still responsible for civil defence. With the forma-
tion of EMO in that year, COG reassigned many of 
those responsibilities to other federal government 
departments, and probably introduced the term 
Federal Readiness Unit to reflect this shared 
responsibility under EMO co-ordination. Health 
and Welfare officials, however, continued to refer 
to both buildings as WSACs throughout the period. 
The Welfare side of the Department of Health 
and Welfare retained responsibility for activities 
consistent with its peacetime mandate. In a national 
emergency. Welfare was responsible for assisting 
provincial and municipal governments in feeding, 
clothing and lodging evacuees, providing emergency 
aid in cash or in kind, and ensuring the continuity 
of normal welfare programs, such as the Canada 
Pension Plan, Family Allowances and Old Age 
Security. In addition, the Registration and Inquiry 
Service was mandated to facilitate the reuniting 
of separated families (e.g., to register and find 
missing persons), to register evacuees from the 
disaster area, to register injured persons, and to 
identify the dead. Welfare planners developed 
several forms (or rather adapted them from 
American samples) that included an Unidentified 
Person Form, a Missing Person Form, a Missing 
Person Report, a Change of Address Form, and a 
Safety Notification Card. Each WSAC stockpiled 
a supply of these forms in the Readiness Unit 
to be used during the recovery phase to track the 
changing demographics of the disaster area and 
to care for those affected.25 
Federal Department Relocation Site (FDRS) 
Also called Federal Relocation Sites or Central 
Relegation Units, these protected "fallout shelters" 
were invariably below ground level. When 
applied to the Kemptville and Carleton Place 
buildings, the term properly refers to the basement 
portion only. Because they were intended to 
house manning personnel for the duration of 
the two-week shock phase, they had to be self-
contained, reinforced against impact, and radia-
tion proof. Hence, the walls were constructed of 
thick reinforced concrete. Each shelter had an 
operations and information display centre, work 
areas, a kitchen, dining room, dormitories, and a 
sickbay. Storage rooms contained food, equipment. 
and supplies to sustain eighty people for fourteen 
or fifteen days. The message and communications 
centre and essential records vault were centrally 
located. Access could be gained only by passing 
through a decontamination area with a disrobing 
area, showers, a supply of clean clothing, and 
a dressing area. It was located at the bottom of 
the stairway that led down from the front entrance 
on the ground floor. The facility drew electricity 
from the local commercial power supply, but 
standby power was available from an emergency 
generator. Life support systems included a heating 
system with fifteen days supply of fuel, air 
conditioning, and a ventilation system designed 
to filter outside air for radioactive particles. Reloca-
tion sites were constructed on solid bedrock for 
maximum stability. Occupants drew water from 
on-site wells.26 
Fig. 5 (helow) 
A wall map of Canada 
from the operations mom 
in the Carleton Place 
relocation unit 
Fig. 6 (bottom) 
These tanks were part of 
the Kemptville relocation 
unit's air and water 
filtration system 
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Fig. 7 
Floor plan for the proposed 
National Health and 
Welfare relocation site 
at the Canadian Civil 
Defence College (CCDC) 
at Amprior. All relocation 
units would have followed 
I hi' same general layout. 
(Reproduced by Mike 
Bechthold, Canadian 
Military History Magazine. 
from a hand-drawn original 
located by author. I 
(NACRG29.1011, 
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The shower in the Carleton 
Place relocation unit's 
decontamination area 
Two tunnels led from the exterior to the decon-
tamination area. Personnel could enter or escape 
the bunker through heavy steel interior doors, 
while it remained sealed off from the readiness 
unit. Sand was packed into the tunnels to prevent 
collapse and provide an air-tight seal against radi-
ation, but could be removed to facilitate access or 
egress, and the timnels refilled. 
Both sites still contain their original diesel 
generators. The one in Kemptville was still 
working during the ice storm in 1998. The 
original furnace is still in use at Carleton Place, 
although a modern burner has been installed. 
Much of the old drainage equipment is still 
operational, but both basements have had periodic 
problems with water seepage and flooding over 
the years.27 
The personnel of a relocation site included an 
administrative element made up of a site manager, 
a Department of Public Works engineer, an admin-
istrative support person, plus a communications 
staff of between seven and ten people. In addition, 
an operational element included a National Health 
Services home economist, a medical doctor, and 
an officer from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP). The remainder were essential personnel 
selected from specific government departments 
(including several ministers and deputy ministers) 
and given assignments according to the depart-
ment's manning plan. The total was not to exceed 
eighty, assuming that only the protected portion 
of the building was to be occupied.-" 
Should the officials occupying the Diefenbunker 
at Carp be unable to carry out their duties for what-
ever reason, the ministers assigned to the Kcmiptville 
relocation site would become the Federal Emer-
gency Government of Canada The larger relocation 
site at Arnprior, once completed, was intended 
to assume this "standby" role.29 
Material History Review 57 (Spring 2003) I Revue d'histoire de la culture matérielle 57 (printemps 2003) 
85 
Federal Readiness Unit 
A Readiness Unit was distinct from a relocation 
site in that it was above-ground (in the two two-
storey wooden structures at Kemptville and 
Carleton Place) and was intended to assist the 
civilian population during the recovery phase. As 
noted previously, they could be occupied by Relo-
cation site personnel during the shock phase as long 
as relatively low radiation levels made this feasible. 
Evacuees would need to be fed and sheltered 
following an attack on Ottawa, and many would 
have been injured. Space was allocated to store 
army ration packs, medical kits, sleeping supplies 
(mattresses, pillows, linens, towels) and clothing. 
Each building had a hospital unit containing med-
ical equipment, a well-equipped and provisioned 
kitchen suitable for feeding hundreds of people, 
and cabinets for reference materials and maps. 
EMO appointed a site manager (building admin-
istrator) to ensure a constant state of readiness. 
As the number of staff required to coordinate the 
recovery effort would have increased during an 
actual emergency, the site manager maintained 
office space, work areas, meeting rooms, dormitory 
areas, and storage space for supplies and equipment 
for their use.30 
In peacetime, the site manager ensured that the 
equipment and supplies necessary for recovery 
would be available on very short notice. Routine 
duties included acquiring and storing office supplies 
and furniture and maintaining the equipment 
(typewriters, duplicating equipment, telephone, 
teletype, and generator) in good working order. 
He inspected medical kits every six months and 
replaced dated or deteriorated components, rotated 
perishable office supplies and emergency ration 
packs, ensured that an updated supply of maps 
and Dominion Bureau of Statistics publications 
was available, and managed first aid, food handling, 
sanitary, and radiation reporting procedures. He was 
also required to "set up and maintain...nuclear 
reporting post equipment provided by the Army," 
and to prepare and implement "nuclear reporting 
procedures." The significance of this will be seen 
when Nuclear I > ifai uitioi i Reporting Posts (NUDETs) 
are discussed later on.31 
Communications Relay Unit (CRU) 
A dispersed network of small short-wave radio 
transmitter/receiver stations called Communi-
cations Relay I 'nits (CRUs), also referred to as 
Communications Centres or Message Centres, was 
intended for the Ottawa region. These "tenninals" 
had been among DND's earliest prioritias, and were 
to be located, where possible, inside protected 
facilities. Accordingly, three were installed, one in 
Fig. 9 
This motor operated 
the filtration systems 
in the Carleton Place 
relocation unit 
Fig. m 
A steel door to one 
of two sand-filled 
entrance tunnels 
leading to the 
Carleton Place 
relocation unii 
Fig. 11 (below) 
'The kitchen in the Carleton 
Place readiness unit was 
intended to teed evacuees 
from a nuclear strike 
on Ottawa, 
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The door to what was 
once the Communications 
Centre in the Carleton 
Place relocation unit still 
has the original signage 
in place. 
each of the protected relocation sites at KemptvilJe, 
Carleton Place and Smiths Falls in addition to a num-
ber of other locations. The one at Smiths Falls was 
of particular importance because of its direct link 
by underground cable to Richardson Detachment. 
CRUs kept the relocation sites in constant com-
munication with the Diefenbunker, which, in addition 
to co-ordinating communications at the national and 
international levels, served as the hub of a local dis-
persed communicatioas network channeled through 
the Emergency Radio Relay (ERR) System at the 
Richardson Detachment. While the relocation site 
was a civilian RUSTIC installation under EMO, 
the Communications Centre was a military operation 
that was part of project EASE, its commimications 
specialists being members of 1 Army Signals 
Squadron. CRUs were equipped with a normal 
telephone service through the local civil telephone 
exchange and with special telephone circuits from 
the Diefenbunker switchboard linked to the local 
civil telephone exchange. They also had a teletype 
service through a network of telegraph lines leading 
to the Diefenbunker. Communications were kept 
secret through the use of cipher equipment.12 
Nuclear Detonation Reporting Posts (NUDETs) 
The Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting 
System and the National Survival Attack Warning 
System provided instruments to determine and 
report the location of ground zero, the height of the 
burst, the yield of the weapon, the time of detonation 
and the intensity of the radioactive fallout. Trained 
specialists would analyze this information to allow 
for the latest known meteorological data in order 
to predict and monitor the fallout pattern and 
issue warnings to the public by means of radio 
broadcasts or sirens. NUDETs surrounded the six-
teen Canadian cities considered potential targets. 
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There were between three and five for each city 
located in a circular pattern at distances from the 
target of between 48 and 128 kilometres. For Ottawa, 
the designated locations for NUDET posts were 
Arnprior, Carleton Place, and Kemptville. 
In an emergency, NUDETs were to be monitored 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. An 
organization in the immediate vicinity, usually 
a nearby government agency (federal or provin-
cial), national defence installation, police force or 
other body acceptable to EMO, had responsibility 
to maintain the apparatus. At Kemptville and 
Carleton Place, the Department of National Defence 
assigned responsibility to EMO. As noted above, 
this equipment and the operations associated with 
it were the responsibility of the site manager at both 
readiness/relocation units. The "manning" agency 
at Arnprior was to comprise staff of the Canadian 
Civil Defence College.33 
After 1968 
After the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, cautious opti-
mism replaced the paranoia of a few years earlier, 
even as the superpowers were developing more 
powerful nuclear warheads and more sophisticated 
delivery systems. The protective measures included 
in Canada's COG program came to be seen by Cana-
dians as futile, so they turned to the only alternative 
that made any sense under the circumstances: 
finding ways to prevent rather than survive inter-
national nuclear conflict. Civil Defence in Canada 
entered a decade of benign neglect. Severe budget 
cuts Ixsginning in 1968/69 forced EMO to abandon 
all plans for further development and to maintain 
those systems and installations already operational.34 
The Kemptville and Carelton Place facilities 
were now used primarily as government training 
centres, providing classroom space to various gov-
ernment departments for training and development 
programs throughout the 1970s. The RCMP used 
the Carleton Place PSTC as a training facility from 
about 1986 to 1990. Following that, the Canadian 
Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) occupied 
it for a number of years. In 1996 it was purchased 
by the Olde Barracks Community Development 
Corporation, a non-profit organization whose man-
date is to provide community services, which rents 
out office space and conference facilities.35 
The RCMP acquired exclusive use of the 
Kemptville site during the early 1980s and contin-
ues to operate it as a training facility.36 In January 
1998 the most expensive natural disaster in 
Canadian history occurred when an ice storm 
caused massive interruption of electrical power for 
several weeks, affecting not only southern Ontario, 
but much of Quebec, the Maritimes and the north-
eastern United States. The government of Ontario 
declared a state of emergency and Emergency Pre-
paredness Canada, a successor organization to EMC ), 
whose prime focus is on relief from natural rather 
than military disasters, deployed army reservists 
to establish emergency shelters and assist civilian 
authorities throughout tire affected area. Canadian 
Forces personnel engaged in relief operations used 
both the Kemptville and Carleton Place buildings 
as command centres. 
The Diefenbunker remained operational until 
decommissioned by the federal government in 1994. 
The Municipality of West Carleton purchased the 
Fig. 14 (below) 
The original furnace, (with 
modern humer) in the 
Carleton Place Building 
is still operational. 
Fig. 15 (bottom) 
The generator in the 
Carleton Place Huilding: 
its counterpart in the 
Kemptville Building is 
still operational and was 
used during the ice storm 
in 1998. 
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complex and is currently restoring it and operating 
it as "The Diefenbunker Museum." The Richardson 
Detachment transmitter site has since been disman-
tled, but the building was still in place in 1995 
when Paul Ozorak took photographs of it to 
include in his book Bunkers Bunkers Everywhere.37 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to resist the temptation to compare 
Canadian Cold War bunkers with their American 
counterparts which, like Cheyenne Mountain in 
Colorado, were virtual underground cities. U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once wrote that 
"Canadian leaders had a narrow margin for maneu-
ver that they utilized with extraordinary skill."38 
The same could be said of Canada's civil defence 
planners as they attempted to implement a practi-
cable continuity of government program without 
the vast resources available to the Americans. With 
restrictions on the size and number of centralized 
facilities that could be built, they opted for the next 
best alternative. They dispersed COG operations 
over a broad area to iriinimize the possibility of the 
entire system being put out of action at once, and 
used existing accommodation whenever possible 
to minimize the expense. 
Despite these preparations, Canadian military 
analysts for the most part continued to believe that 
the main targets of a Soviet nuclear attack would 
be in Europe or the United States and that strikes 
against Canada, if they occurred, would be limited, 
diversionary, or even accidental.39 Increasingly, 
they came to the view that if a concentrated attack 
on the national capital did occur, the destruction 
would have been massive. One veteran of the pro-
gram assured the author that it was generally 
accepted by informed insiders by the mid-1960s that 
even a "tactical hit" on Ottawa by a Soviet weapon 
of the magnitude readily available, would have left 
little of Canada's COG infrastructure intact.40 There 
is, perhaps, an irony in the timing of Canada's Cold 
War preparations. The establishment of a function-
ing COG network and the peak of federal defence 
spending coincided with the height of international 
tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. But 
virtually the moment they became operational the 
crisis passed, other priorities intervened and they 
began their decline into obsolescence. 
The "little bunkers" served their purpose for a 
brief period of time. But, with the advent of more 
sophisticated military technologies, the shifting 
realities of international politics and changing fiscal 
priorities, they quickly outlived their usefulness. 
They were successful in one major respect. Given 
the paramount importance of secrecy for any pro-
gram of civil defence, they never became well 
enough known to be forgotten. 
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